



Peter of Trabibus (*fl.* 1295), O.F.M.,  
on the Physical and Mental Abilities of Children in Paradise

by  
RUSSELL L. FRIEDMAN\*

ABSTRACT: Adam and Eve had no children in paradise, but there was nevertheless a lively later Medieval discussion concerning the physical and mental characteristics that such children might have had. The present article offers a critical edition of one contribution to that discussion: Peter of Trabibus' II *Sentences*, d. 20, qq. 1-2 and 5. As the introduction to the edition makes clear, Peter, arguing against Thomas Aquinas, held that an authoritative text of Augustine gives us license to attribute rather wide-ranging physical and mental abilities to infants in the state of innocence, like being able to speak, walk, and use their inborn reason from birth. The hypothetical children would, however, only acquire intellectual knowledge with time, since they, just like we after the Fall, would need to use the senses to acquire that knowledge.

KEYWORDS: Peter of Trabibus, Thomas Aquinas, Human Nature, Abilities, Authority

ABSTRACT: Adamo ed Eva non hanno avuto figli nel paradiso; malgrado ciò c'è stata una vivace discussione nel mondo medievale sulle caratteristiche fisiche e mentali che questi bambini avrebbero potuto avere. Il presente articolo presenta un'edizione critica di un contributo a questa discussione: il commento al II Libro delle *Sentenze* di Pietro di Trabibus, d. 20, qq. 1-2 e 5. Come chiarisce l'introduzione all'edizione, Pietro, contro Tommaso d'Aquino, sostiene che un autorevole testo di Agostino ci dà l'autorizzazione ad attribuire capacità fisiche e mentali piuttosto ampie ai bambini nello stato

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di innocenza, come l'essere capace di parlare, il poter camminare e usare la ragione innata fin dalla nascita. Questi bambini ipotetici, però, acquisirebbero conoscenze intellettuali solo con il tempo, poiché, proprio come noi dopo la caduta, avrebbero bisogno di usare i sensi per acquisire tale conoscenza.

KEYWORDS: Pietro di Trabibus, Tommaso d'Aquino, natura umana, capacità, autorità

### *Introduction*

In book II of his *Sentences*, after discussing Paradise, the creation of Adam and Eve, and their general characteristics before the Fall (dd. 17-19), Peter Lombard (d. 1160) turns his attention in d. 20 (chs. 1-3) to why Adam and Eve did not procreate in the state of innocence and whether it was even possible for them to have done so<sup>1</sup>. As a type of coda to that discussion, Lombard, basing himself in large part on statements from Augustine of Hippo (d. 430) and from Hugh of St. Victor (d. 1141), devotes three chapters (4-6) of that distinction to the bodily and mental characteristics and abilities of the children that Adam and Eve might have had. This inquiry is highly speculative, in at least two different ways: speculative in the sense of “hypothetical” or “counterfactual”, since Adam and Eve had no children in Paradise; speculative also because only scattered remarks in Scripture and the tradition could be used as evidence in the inquiry, reason filling in the gaps. In any event, Lombard's broaching of this issue in his *Sentences* undoubtedly contributed to widespread discussion of it among thirteenth-century scholastics, in such works as *Summae*<sup>2</sup> and, of course,

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<sup>1</sup> For II *Sentences*, d. 20 (cc. 1-6 = cc. 116-121), see Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae in quatuor libris distinctae*, 2 vols., ed. I. Brady, Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, Grottaferrata (Rome) 1971-1981, esp. vol. 1, pp. 427-433. On this material in Lombard, see M. L. Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 2 vols., Brill, Leiden 1994, esp. vol. 1, pp. 368-369, and for context pp. 366-372, and P. Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004, esp. pp. 107-108. While writing the present article I have unfortunately not had available to me Alistair Minnis' recent *From Eden to Eternity: Creations of Paradise in the Later Middle Ages*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2016.

<sup>2</sup> The Franciscan authors of the *Summa Halensis*, for example, deal with these issues in lib. II, pars 1, inq. 4, tract. 3, q. 2, cc. 2-3 in *Alexandri de Hales Summa theologica*, vol. 2, Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Quaracchi 1928, pp. 716-723. Aquinas deals with them in, e.g., II *Sentences*, d. 20, q. 2, aa. 1-2, and *Summa Theologiae* (hereafter: *ST*) I, qq. 99-101 (I have used the Leonine edition, vol. IV, Ex Typographia Polyglotta, Rome 1888).

*Sentences* commentaries. By that point, the inquiry was usually organized around a number of interrelated issues: would children before the Fall have had from birth the full physical characteristics and abilities that the original couple had immediately? Would they have had immediate use of reason? Would they have been born with complete intellectual knowledge? Or would they grow into their abilities and knowledge, as their bodies and minds developed?

These are the questions with which the Franciscan author Peter of Trabibus wrestles in the texts edited below. We know basically nothing about Peter himself, but can surmise that he taught at the Franciscan convent in Florence (Santa Croce) during the last decade of the thirteenth century and was almost certainly there in the late 1280s when Peter of John Olivi (d. 1298) was there teaching, since Peter of Trabibus was clearly influenced on many issues by Peter Olivi. From Peter's hand we have an enormous and mostly unedited commentary on books I, II, and IV *Sentences*; three questions from Peter's II *Sentences*, d. 20 are edited and studied for the first time in the present article<sup>3</sup>.

In those three questions, Peter deals with the following issues:

- 1) Would children in Paradise have been born with the fullness of their bodily characteristics like adult size, ability to move, and ability to speak?
- 2) Would children in Paradise have had the use of reason from birth?
- 5) Would children in Paradise be born with all the knowledge they would ever have<sup>4</sup>?

The first question is the longest of the three. After several arguments for and then against the view that children in Paradise would be born with their full bodily characteristics and abilities (§§I.1-5<sup>5</sup>), Peter turns to Hugh of St. Victor's view that children would not be born fully

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<sup>3</sup> On Peter of Trabibus, see my forthcoming *The Sentences Commentary of Peter of Trabibus: With Question Lists and Text Editions on Matter, Form, Body, and Soul*. Sylvain Piron has kindly informed me that, in his mostly unpublished *Sentences* commentary, Peter of John Olivi deals with one of the questions that Peter of Trabibus tackles in the material edited below; it will be important in future research to see whether Olivi influenced Trabibus on these issues.

<sup>4</sup> I have not edited qq. 3-4 dealing with the type of "justice" (original or acquired) that offspring in Paradise would have possessed.

<sup>5</sup> Throughout the article references of the form "§x.y" refer the reader to "quaestio x, paragraph y".

developed (§I.6). Peter presents Hugh as arguing that the example of brute animals shows clearly that being born with underdeveloped bodies and bodily powers is not a result of sin (since brute animals cannot sin), and hence that example also shows that the growth and physical development of offspring is just a feature of animal life and nature in general – including human animals. Peter (§I.7) takes Hugh to be saying that children born in the state of innocence would have the same type of bodily characteristics and undergo the same type of bodily development as children born now, after the Fall, do, and Peter objects to this because “in the state of innocence they would be deprived of no necessary act”, which is not the case today (cf. §I.15). Peter then offers an entire paragraph (§I.8) lifted more or less verbatim from one of “the modern masters”, namely Thomas Aquinas<sup>6</sup>. Aquinas had maintained that we should adhere to explanations that appeal to the nature of whatever it is we are investigating, unless we have explicit authoritative text suggesting that that sort of natural explanation is inappropriate<sup>7</sup>. On the issue of whether a child in Paradise would have all its bodily abilities, Aquinas apparently recognized no compelling authoritative texts that ruled out an appeal to human nature, since he claims that there are good physiological reasons, having to do with the nature of human beings, that children, before and after the Fall, do not have physical abilities beyond the most simple (e.g., nursing). Aquinas allows that God could have done things differently, so that children in

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<sup>6</sup> Cf. the text in §I.8 with Thomas de Aquino, *ST I*, q. 99, a. 1 («Utrum pueri in statu innocentiae, mox nati, virtutem perfectam habuissent ad motum membrorum»), resp. (italicized text not included by Peter in his question): «Respondeo dicendum quod ea quae sunt supra naturam, sola fide tenemus; quod autem credimus, auctoritati debemus. Unde in omnibus asserendis sequi debemus naturam rerum, praeter ea quae auctoritate divina traduntur, quae sunt supra naturam. Manifestum est autem naturale hoc esse, utpote et principiis humanae naturae competens, quod pueri mox nati non habeant sufficientem virtutem ad movendum membra. Quia homo naturaliter habet cerebrum maius in quantitate, secundum proportionem sui corporis, quam cetera animalia. Unde naturale est quod propter maximam humiditatem cerebri in pueris, nervi, qui sunt instrumenta motus, non sunt idonei ad movendum membra. *Ex alia vero parte nulli catholico dubium est quin divina virtute fieri possit ut pueri mox nati perfectam virtutem habeant ad motum membrorum [...]* Dicendum est ergo quod pueri mox nati non habuissent sufficientem virtutem ad movendum membra ad quoslibet actus, sed ad actus pueritiae convenientes, puta ad sugendum ubera, et ad alia huiusmodi».

<sup>7</sup> For another statement by Aquinas of this methodological principle, see the text in n. 14 below.

Paradise might have had physical abilities that went beyond those now normal for their age; but barring such divine intervention, the hypothetical children in Paradise would have been much like postlapsarian children. Aquinas' position can reasonably be described as naturalistic: it takes its point of departure in human nature, using physiological arguments to insist that children in Paradise would have had physical abilities on a par with children after the Fall.

Peter immediately attacks Aquinas' view (§1.9): following the nature of things in that way will only lead us astray. Peter accuses Thomas of taking the way things are in our post-lapsarian reality and applying it uncritically to the hypothetical pre-lapsarian world: "that it would then be natural for children to have nerves incapable of effecting motion is assumed from the fact that they have [nerves like that] now, and it is not *proved*; indeed, it ... goes directly against Augustine". As the reference to Augustine might suggest, Peter thinks that we should rather (§1.10) look to scripture and the faith to help direct our fallible reason. To put this in another way: in contrast to Aquinas, Peter thinks that we do have explicit authoritative testimony that in this context makes appeal to human nature as we now know it untenable.

Peter's own position involves the use of a distinction made by Peter Lombard and a rather expansive view of the physical abilities that children in Paradise would have. Peter employs (§1.11) a distinction made by Lombard between three different ways something can be called "complete" or "perfect" (*perfectum*)<sup>8</sup>. God and God alone is "universally perfect"; a fully grown human being in possession of all the abilities of a human being can be called "perfect according to nature"; finally, and most relevantly, something can be "perfect according to time", when it has the abilities that correspond to its place in its life cycle. Children, then, according to Peter, are perfect according to time, and this is true also for those hypothetical prelapsarian children. Thus, those children would have been born small and grown to full size, Peter's main evidence for this assertion being the impossibility of a full-grown human being fitting into the mother's womb<sup>9</sup>. Thus far, Peter sounds like Aquinas, who had claimed that newborns in Paradise would have had "abilities sufficient for the actions befitting childhood", like sucking at

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<sup>8</sup> See Petrus Lombardus (*op. cit.*, n. 1 above), *Sententiae* II, d. 4 (= cap. 19, 6; ed. cit., vol. 1, pp. 350, l. 19-351, l. 3).

<sup>9</sup> This is taken straight from Augustine; see the text quoted by Peter in §1.12.

the breast<sup>10</sup>. But, as mentioned, Peter in fact has a much more expansive view of the abilities of those children (§1.11). Certainly, because of their small stature, some abilities would only come with time, like the ability to reproduce or to “bear honors” (*honora portare*) (cf. also §2.14). But physical limitations on children in Paradise would be rather strictly limited to abilities that would be hindered by the newborn child’s size (and this is the sense in which they are “perfect according to time”). Thus, in addition to abilities that also postlapsarian children have, like the ability to grow, children in Paradise would have further abilities that are not stature-dependent, abilities like being able to walk and to speak “without which the human requirements for that state could not be met in full (*compleri*)”. Peter almost seems to suggest that children in Paradise would *not* have been fully human if they could not speak or walk, and he certainly seems to consider those activities to be among the “necessary acts” that we saw above he claimed the infants of paradise would not be deprived of. What is certain is that, according to Peter, since it is at least conceivable that the children’s small size would not pose an obstacle to exercising those abilities, we should attribute the abilities to them.

This is a significantly different view than the one Aquinas defended, and Peter makes it clear (§1.12) that his justification for maintaining the view comes from Augustine of Hippo. In his *Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum*, Augustine has a passage, quoted by Peter at length, that Peter takes to show that the children in Paradise «would have some imperfections [both] in the size of their bodies on account of the size of the maternal womb, and in those [characteristics] that follow naturally (*naturaliter*) [only] from the fullness (*perfectio*) of their size; but other [imperfections] that children now have they would not have, such as lack of mobility and inability to speak what is necessary, and things of that kind». For Peter, it is this statement from Augustine that warrants our going beyond human nature as we know it in our post-lapsarian world, and attribute to (hypothetical) infants in Paradise abilities, like walking and speaking, that their small size would not hinder. Thus, only characteristics and abilities that depend “naturally” (*naturaliter*) on a human being reaching full stature would have been compromised, becoming available to these children only over the course of time as they grow to (bodily) maturity.

The second question edited below deals with whether children in

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<sup>10</sup> See the text at the end of n. 6 above.

Paradise would have full use reason from birth. Once again, after initial arguments (§2.1-5), Aquinas' is the main view presented, although not in verbatim form<sup>11</sup>. The basic problem, for Aquinas (§2.6), with attributing to babies the full use of reason is that they do not have well developed sense organs – particularly, it appears, the internal sense organs, which suffer from excessive moisture in the infant brain –, and since the intellect and reason depend in some way on the senses to function, this rules out newborns, pre- or postlapsarian, from perfectly using reason. Aquinas does suggest that even newborns in paradise would have some (less-than-complete) use of reason and that, at all stages of development, prelapsarian children would enjoy more complete use of reason than postlapsarian children of the same age do<sup>12</sup>. Although he mentions it in passing, Peter is not particularly interested in that element of Aquinas' view. For Peter (§2.7), the important point is that Aquinas is again ignoring Augustine. Thus, according to Peter, the prelapsarian infant's use of reason would not be affected by the size of the infant body, and hence would be complete, and Augustine gives us warrant to conclude this. Indeed, Peter offers an example of one perfect use of reason that infants in Paradise, lacking original sin (*culpa originalis*), must have (§2.8): the perfect intellectual act of knowing God. Moreover (§2.9), since, as Augustine tells us, not being able to access moral precepts is a result of sin, these prelapsarian babies would have such access, and that requires reason<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>11</sup> Cf. the text in §2.6 with Thomas de Aquino, *ST I*, q. 101, a. 2 («Utrum pueri mox nati habuissent perfectum usum rationis»), resp.: «[...] usus rationis dependet quodammodo ex usu virium sensitivarum: unde ligato sensu et impeditis interioribus viribus sensitivis, homo perfectum usum rationis non habet [...] Vires autem sensitivae sunt virtutes quaedam corporalium organorum, et ideo, impeditis earum organis, necesse est quod earum actus impediatur, et per consequens rationis usus. In pueris autem est impedimentum harum virium propter nimiam humiditatem cerebri. Et ideo in eis non est perfectus usus rationis, sicut nec aliorum membrorum. Et ideo pueri in statu innocentiae non habuissent perfectum usum rationis, sicut habituri erant in perfecta aetate. Habuissent tamen perfectiorem quam nunc, quantum ad ea quae ad eos pertinebant quantum ad statum illum, sicut et de usu membrorum superius est dictum». As far as I can tell, in *ST I*, q. 99, a. 1 (see n. 6 above) Aquinas does not explicitly state that children in paradise would have more complete control over the movement of their limbs than postlapsarian children do.

<sup>12</sup> For more on Aquinas' view, see also n. 13 below.

<sup>13</sup> In fact, in the article before the one cited in n. 11 above, Aquinas uses the argument about prelapsarian newborns needing access to moral precepts as a ground to attribute to them some use of reason. *ST I*, q. 101, a. 1 («Utrum in statu innocentiae pueri

To flesh out this view on the use of reason by children in Paradise, Peter draws a distinction between two kinds of uses of reason (2.11): one kind coming from inborn capability, another requiring practice. With regard to the type of use of reason requiring practice – syllogizing and judging truth from falsity – the children in Paradise would need to grow into the full use of reason, since practice requires time. But with respect to the use of reason as an inborn capacity, children in Paradise would have full use of reason from birth, enabling them to have the vision of God and to access moral and intellectual precepts. Interestingly, Peter responds directly to Aquinas’ claim that the children in Paradise would not have fully functioning senses (§2.12): it is true that the sensory organs would not be as large as an adult’s, but those organs would be perfectly proportioned to support their sensory act and hence be able to support the full use of reason (understood in the first sense of ‘use of reason’). Once again, then, Peter has used Augustine as license to reason to an extended set of abilities for prelapsarian children as compared to children in our postlapsarian world, including even access to the beatific vision.

Finally, the third question edited below (the fifth of the article) deals with the fullness of knowledge in these children. Would children in paradise have been born complete in their intellectual knowledge? In this question, Peter takes his point of departure in an Aristotelian view of the process of cognition on which the mind at birth is like a *tabula rasa* (§5.4)<sup>14</sup>. Moreover, he claims (§5.6) that there is neither good reason

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nati fuissent in scientia perfecti»), ad tertium: «[...] pueri <mox nati> habuissent sufficientem scientiam ad dirigendum eos in operibus iustitiae in quibus homines diriguntur per universalia principia iuris; quam multo plenius tunc habuissent quam nunc naturaliter habemus, et similiter aliorum universalium principiorum». This is the clearest statement I find in this context in Aquinas’ *ST* that prelapsarian newborns have some use of reason (for more on Aquinas’ position in this article from the *ST*, see n. 14 below). In contrast to Aquinas, Peter of Trabibus thinks that those newborns have (at least some) “perfect” (*perfectus*) use of reason (hence the beatific vision), and Peter makes explicit what type of use of reason is at issue (see below).

<sup>14</sup> In this way, Peter’s view on this issue does not diverge significantly from the main lines that Thomas Aquinas follows, including Aquinas’ methodological principle that when there is no relevant authoritative passage, our inquiry should be conducted within the boundaries of the pertinent natural conditions. Cf. Thomas de Aquino, *ST* I, q. 101, a. 1 (cit. n. 13 above), resp.: «[...] de his quae sunt supra naturam, soli auctoritati creditur, unde ubi auctoritas deficit, sequi debemus naturae conditionem. Est autem naturale homini ut scientiam per sensus acquirat [...] et ideo anima unitur corpori, quia indiget eo ad suam propriam operationem. Quod non esset, si statim a principio



nor any authoritative text that would lead us to believe that, had humankind never fallen, children would have been able to acquire knowledge in any way other than the way they do now: through the senses. Hence, children born before the Fall would have had to acquire all the knowledge they ever had in just the same way as children do now. According to Peter, however, the hypothetical prelapsarian children would be less prone to error in their acquisition of intellectual knowledge than children now, and they would acquire it more quickly, since they could begin to fully use reason as soon as they were born (see q. 2).

For such a speculative question, Peter offers a robust defense of some extended abilities for children that Adam and Eve might counterfactually have had before the Fall. Those children would immediately after birth be able to speak and walk and do anything that an adult can do except what their small size would prohibit. They would be able to use their innate reason to access moral precepts and know and love God, although formal reasoning would take them some time to master. While they would be born without conceptual knowledge, nevertheless they would acquire it in the course of time with greater facility than children do in our fallen world. For Peter, the claims he makes for the expanded abilities of children in Paradise are warranted on the basis of Augustine's remarks in his incomplete work in reply to Julian of Eclanum. In contrast to Aquinas, then, for whom we had no genuine authoritative guide when it came to those hypothetical children, and hence for whom we should chiefly reason about them on the basis of what we know about human nature now, Peter thought that current human nature was a fairly imperfect guide to the human species in Paradise. Hopefully the editions below will help us to see how Peter fit into the later thirteenth-century Franciscan discussion of these issues, whether he was merely parroting his confreres or had something to add to the debate. That is a topic for future research<sup>15</sup>.

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scientiam haberet non acquisitam per sensitivas virtutes. Et ideo dicendum est quod pueri in statu innocentiae non nascerentur perfecti in scientia, sed eam in processu temporis absque difficultate acquisivissent, inveniendo vel addiscendo».

<sup>15</sup> A possible place to start when reconstructing the debate would be the *Summa Halensis* (see n. 2 above), in which the authors suggest (caput 3, pp. 721-722) that the bodily limitations of postlapsarian children are a result of sin and hence children in Paradise would likely be able to walk and have full command of their limbs, although the power of speaking might be beyond them; the authors of the *Summa Halensis* further suggest (caput 2, p. 718) that children in Paradise would have some intellectual knowledge from their very beginning, although how much and of what

### *The Editions*

The editions below of Peter of Trabibus' II *Sentences*, d. 20, art. 2, qq. 1-2 and 5, are made on the basis of the only three known surviving witnesses, specifically<sup>16</sup>:

Ao = Aosta, Comunale 4946, ff. 139vb-142ra

F = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, conv. soppr. B.5.1149, ff. 108rb-109vb

N = Nürnberg, Bibl. Civit., Gent. II, 6, ff. 91vb-93rb

My *modus edendi* is as follows: I transcribe the text from F, after which I go through Ao and N to find spots where F has dropped or muddled what I take to be Peter's authentic text. This *modus edendi* implies that I consider F to be the best of the three manuscripts while still presenting instances in which the other two manuscripts offer useful corrections, and this is indeed my view: F is superior to the other two manuscripts but it contains some clear omissions per homeoteleuton and faulty readings that Ao and/or N correct. In order to document this and hence justify my *modus edendi*, I have recorded all variants between the manuscripts in the *apparatus criticus* for the first of the three questions edited below (i.e., for q. 1). Four main conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the variants recorded there:

- 1) Upon even a cursory inspection the variants reveal that Ao and N agree with each other far more often than either agree with F, thus establishing that, in this part of Peter's II *Sentences*, there are two main branches in the manuscript tradition: F vs. AoN.
- 2) Comparing the variant readings recorded in the apparatus with the readings I have chosen to be in line with Peter's original intention, it is clear that, while some of the variants offered by AoN would make philological and philosophical sense, the majority can only be considered errors.

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type is difficult to say, although it seems probable with respect to moral and religious matters they would have a more expansive use of reason than we do now. As mentioned above (n. 3), with regard to Peter of Trabibus and his place in the Franciscan tradition on this issue, very important will be to study Peter of John Olivi's mostly unedited *Sentences* commentary.

<sup>16</sup> For descriptions of the manuscripts, see my forthcoming book on Peter (see n. 3 above).

3) In my reconstruction of the text that Peter most probably had in mind, Ao appears to be slightly less flawed than N.

4) There are several instances in which F has dropped or garbled the text<sup>17</sup>.

To put some numbers on this, here is a tabulation of the variants as recorded in the *apparatus criticus* for the first question edited below:

*Total Shared Variants*

AoN	35	
AoF	3	
(FN		0)

*Total Unique Variants*

N	60
Ao	46
F	15

Headline conclusion from this particular study of the manuscript tradition: when establishing a text, F must be considered the main manuscript, but it must be checked against Ao and N. I have followed this procedure in the other two questions edited here (qq. 2 and 5). Thus, I have taken F as a base text, checking it exhaustively against Ao and N. But for these latter two questions I have sought to simplify where possible by in nearly all cases exclusively recording variants in a negative fashion, i.e. exclusively when deviating from the base text in F on the basis of variant readings in Ao and/or N. In the end, the text from the three manuscripts has needed a good deal of emendation, and in several instances still appears to me to be just barely comprehensible (e.g. §§I.7, 2.8).

It should be noted that, in the extensive editing from throughout Peter's II *Sentences* that I have been doing for my forthcoming book<sup>18</sup>, I have consistently found the same relation between the manuscripts as that presented here. It seems that any critical edition from Peter's II *Sentences* will need to depend on F as a main, most reliable manuscript,

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<sup>17</sup> Note that all F's 15 unique variants in q. 1 involve 1-2 words (usually 1 word); in q. 2, however, F has a 6-word omission per homeoteleuton, in the context of a paragraph (§2.8) the transmission of which appears to be quite corrupt.

<sup>18</sup> See n. 3 above.

with both Ao and N being consulted in their entirety to allows us to correct for errors that F on occasion evinces.

All of my work on the editions has been done from scans of the relevant manuscripts. I have not recorded scribal self-corrections, word order variations (unless they might make a difference in meaning), or (forms of) the following: *ergo-igitur*, *illud-id*, *ista-illa*, *quia-quod*. In reading the manuscripts, I have applied a principle of charity throughout: if I could justify reading the manuscript in the way that both sense and the other witnesses most obviously suggested, I did so.

*Symbols and abbreviations used in the apparatus:*

<x> = I judge x should be added  
[x] = I judge that x should be expunged  
\* = lectio incerta  
*add.:* *addidit*  
*codd.:* *codices*  
*coni.:* *coniectura*  
*exp.:* *expunxit*  
*hom.:* *homoeoteleuton*  
*inv.:* *invertit*  
*om.:* *omisit*

AA = *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. J. Hamesse, *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis: Un florilège médiéval*, Étude historique et édition critique, Peeters, Leuven-Paris 1974.

AL = *Aristoteles Latinus*

CCL = *Corpus Christianorum*, series Latina

CSEL = *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*

PL = *Patrologia Latina* (ed. J.-P. Migne)

ST = *Summa Theologiae*

Petri de Trabibus II *Sententiarum*, d. 20, art. 2  
<De conservatione speciei, circa modum generatorum>

Quantum ad<sup>1</sup> secundum principale quaeruntur quinque. Primo est<sup>2</sup> utrum in /Ao 140ra/ statu innocentiae filii nascerentur perfecti quoad virtutem corporalem. Secundo utrum mox nati haberent usum rationis. Tertio utrum nascerentur omnes<sup>3</sup> iusti. Quarto<sup>4</sup> est<sup>5</sup> utrum nascerentur omnes in iustitia confirmati. Quinto utrum nascerentur omnes<sup>6</sup> in scientia perfecti.

<Quaestio prima>

[1] Quaeritur ergo primo utrum in statu innocentiae filii nascerentur perfecti quoad virtutem corporalem. Quod sic videtur. Augustinus, I *De baptismo parvulorum*<sup>7</sup>, dicit quod “infirmi-  
tati mentis congruit haec<sup>8</sup> infirmitas corporis” quae<sup>9</sup> in pueris apparet. Sed tunc nulla fuisset in filiis<sup>10</sup> mentis infirmitas; ergo nec corporis. Ergo, etc.

[2] Item, inter omnia animalia nobilium et perfectius est homo. Sed pulli quorundam<sup>11</sup> animalium cito post nativitatem pos-

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<sup>1</sup> quantum ad] circa Ao

<sup>2</sup> est om. AoN

<sup>3</sup> omnes om. Ao

<sup>4</sup> Quarto] Quartum F

<sup>5</sup> est om. AoN

<sup>6</sup> omnes om. Ao

<sup>7</sup> Augustinus, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione, et de baptismo parvulorum ad Marcellinum libri tres*, lib. I, cap. 38, n. 69 (PL 44, col. 150; CSEL 60, p. 70, ll. 1-2).

<sup>8</sup> haec om. N

<sup>9</sup> quae] quod N

<sup>10</sup> in filiis om. AoN

<sup>11</sup> quorundam] quorumlibet\* Ao

sunt ire et currere sicut pulli parditum<sup>12</sup>. Ergo multo fortius tunc<sup>13</sup> hoc homines possent<sup>14</sup>.

[3] Item, sicut est nunc<sup>15</sup> imperfectio<sup>16</sup> senectutis, sic et<sup>17</sup> iuventutis. Sed tunc non esset imperfectio senectutis. Ergo nec<sup>18</sup> iuventutis.

[4] **Contra:** secundum Augustinum, *De quantitate animae*<sup>19</sup>, tria faciunt vires naturales<sup>20</sup> corporales, scilicet<sup>21</sup> virtus animae, machinamentum nervorum, et moles corporis. Sed tunc in pueris non esset machinamentum<sup>22</sup> nervorum nec moles corporis perfecta. Ergo, etc<sup>23</sup>.

[5] Item, omne generatum prius est imperfectum quam perficiatur. Sed pueri<sup>24</sup> in statu innocentiae per generationem perficerentur. Ergo prius essent imperfecti quam perfecti<sup>25</sup>.

[6] **Responsio.** secundum Hugonem, libro I *De sacramentis*, parte 6<sup>26</sup>,<sup>27</sup> simpliciter conceditur quod pueri in statu innocentiae

<sup>12</sup> parditum] et huiusmodi *add.* Ao

<sup>13</sup> tunc *om.* N

<sup>14</sup> possent] possunt AoN

<sup>15</sup> nunc *om.* N

<sup>16</sup> nunc imperfectio] unaque senectute Ao

<sup>17</sup> et *om.* AoN

<sup>18</sup> nec *om.* N

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Augustinus, *De quantitate animae*, cap. 22, n. 38 (PL 32, col. 1057; CSEL 89, p. 178, ll. 2-3, 6-7, 18-20 et pp. 178, l. 23-179, l. 4): «[...] vide nunc eas quae dicuntur in animalibus vires, utrum rationi huic congruant [...] nutus animae ad movendum corporis pondus, nervis quasi tormentis utitur [...] Si igitur et nutu animae et nervorum quodam machinamento et pondere corporis confiunt eae quae vires vocantur, voluntas nutum exhibet [...] machinamentum configuratio quaedam corporis coaptat, temperatio modificat valetudinis, confirmat exercitationis industria; pondus dat moles membrorum, quam aetas et nutrimenta comparant, instaurant autem sola nutrimenta».

<sup>20</sup> naturales *om.* AoN

<sup>21</sup> scilicet *om.* AoN

<sup>22</sup> nervorum, et .... machinatum *om. homeo.* N

<sup>23</sup> perfecta. Ergo, etc *om.* AoN

<sup>24</sup> pueri *om.* Ao

<sup>25</sup> imperfecti quam perfecti] perfecti quam imperfecti AoN

<sup>26</sup> 6] I Ao; tum\* N

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Hugo de Sancto Victore, *De sacramentis*, lib. I, pars 6 (cap. 26) («Utrum perfecti nascerentur statura et scientia») (PL 176, coll. 278-280; *Hugonis de Sancto Victore. De sacramentis Christiane fidei*, ed. R. Berndt, Aschendorff, Münster in Westfalen 2008, pp. 157-159).

nascerentur imperfecti<sup>28</sup> quoad virtutem corporalem, et ratio eius<sup>29</sup> est per simile in aliis generatis, quia<sup>30</sup> in qualibet specie aliorum generantium prima individua sic sunt producta perfecta<sup>31</sup>, quod tamen producerent<sup>32</sup> imperfecta. Non enim potest dici quod imperfectio generatorum in aliis generantibus contingit ex peccato<sup>33</sup>, ergo in homine similiter imperfectio nascentium quoad corpus et corporis vires non videtur ex peccato contigisse, et ita esset tunc sicut modo.

[7] Sed modus iste non habet<sup>34</sup> universaliter veritatem, constat enim quod<sup>35</sup> modo in pueris sunt quaedam corporales<sup>36</sup> imperfectiones quae inferunt indigentiam et privant pro statu illo membrorum<sup>37</sup> necessariis<sup>38</sup> usque et actibus<sup>39</sup> potentiarum<sup>39</sup>, sicut patet, quia nec mamillas<sup>40</sup> quaerere<sup>41</sup> nec ad eas<sup>42</sup> se movere queunt nec ad evacuationes<sup>43</sup> necessarias<sup>44</sup> faciendas <† ... †> a loco se movere. Constat autem<sup>45</sup> quod in statu innocentiae nullo actu necessario privarentur<sup>46</sup>. Ergo non<sup>47</sup> est universaliter verum quod tunc essent sic imperfecti sicut modo.

[8] Quidam autem<sup>48</sup> magistrorum modernorum<sup>49</sup> dicunt quod ea quae sunt supra naturam sola fide teneamus<sup>51</sup> et ideo in

<sup>28</sup> imperfecti] perfecti N

<sup>29</sup> eius] huius F

<sup>30</sup> quia] et N

<sup>31</sup> perfecta] facta AoN

<sup>32</sup> producerent] producerentur N

<sup>33</sup> ex peccato] excepto N

<sup>34</sup> habet] dicit F

<sup>35</sup> quod] quo Ao

<sup>36</sup> corporales] naturales AoN

<sup>37</sup> membrorum] *om.* AoN; vel *add.* F

<sup>38</sup> necessari] necessarium\* N

<sup>39</sup> potentiarum] potestatem N

<sup>40</sup> mamillas] machinas *codd.*

<sup>41</sup> quaerere] quare AoN

<sup>42</sup> eas] ea Ao

<sup>43</sup> evacuationes] vacuationes N

<sup>44</sup> necessarias] necessariis\* N

<sup>45</sup> autem *om.* Ao

<sup>46</sup> privarentur] privaretur Ao

<sup>47</sup> non] si N

<sup>48</sup> autem] enim F; *om.* N

<sup>49</sup> modernorum] sunt qui *add.* Ao

<sup>50</sup> Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologia* I, q. 99, a. 1, resp. (quasi verbatim).

<sup>51</sup> teneamus] tenemus F

talibus debemus consequi<sup>52</sup> auctoritatem, in omnibus vero<sup>53</sup> quae<sup>54</sup> secundum<sup>55</sup> naturam sunt<sup>56</sup> debemus sequi rerum naturam. Manifestum<sup>57</sup> autem est quod<sup>58</sup> naturae humanae incompetens est quod<sup>59</sup> pueri mox nati habeant virtutem ad movendum<sup>60</sup> membra, quoniam homo naturaliter habet cerebrum maius in quantitate<sup>61</sup> secundum proportionem sui corporis quam cetera animalia. Unde naturale<sup>62</sup> est quod propter maximam humiditatem cerebri in pueris, nervi, qui sunt instrumenta motus, non sunt<sup>63</sup> idonei ad movendum membra. Unde<sup>64</sup> nec tunc virtutem talem /Ao 140rb/ habuissent.

[9] Sed si semper sequi velimus<sup>65</sup> rerum naturam, non solum deviabimus a veritate sed etiam errabimus<sup>66</sup> contra fidem. Sic enim philosophi et philosophantes erraverunt, nam qui vult iudicare de humana natura pro statu illo<sup>67</sup> per hoc quod nunc apparet in statu isto, falso et periculose<sup>68</sup> habet iudicare<sup>69</sup>. Unde quod tunc esset naturale in<sup>70</sup> pueris nervos habere ineptos<sup>71</sup> ad motum, supponitur<sup>72</sup> ex<sup>73</sup> hoc /N 92ra/ quod nunc hoc habent<sup>74</sup> <et> non probatur – immo videtur per praedictam rationem improbatum et<sup>75</sup> est directe contra Augustinum, ut patebit consequenter.

<sup>52</sup> consequi] sequi AoN

<sup>53</sup> in omnibus vero] sed in his Ao

<sup>54</sup> in omnibus vero quae *om.* N

<sup>55</sup> secundum] non sunt supra Ao; rerum *add.* N

<sup>56</sup> sunt *om.* Ao

<sup>57</sup> sunt debemus .... Manifestum] quantum N

<sup>58</sup> est quod *om.* N

<sup>59</sup> quod] quam\* F

<sup>60</sup> movendum] modum F

<sup>61</sup> quantitate] qualitate N

<sup>62</sup> naturale] naturaliter Ao

<sup>63</sup> sunt] ibi *add.* N

<sup>64</sup> Unde] ergo Ao

<sup>65</sup> velimus] vellemus AoN

<sup>66</sup> a veritate ... errabimus *om.* AoN

<sup>67</sup> illo] et *add.* N

<sup>68</sup> periculose] periculoso Ao

<sup>69</sup> habet iudicare] habere videtur Ao; licet videtur N

<sup>70</sup> in *om.* AoN

<sup>71</sup> ineptos] ineptum N

<sup>72</sup> supponitur] suppositum AoN

<sup>73</sup> ex] in *codd.*

<sup>74</sup> hoc habent] haberent hoc N

<sup>75</sup> et] enim N



[10] Item, manifestum est quod natura<sup>76</sup> humana est propter<sup>77</sup> peccatum excaecata, sed ratio<sup>78</sup> excaecata de facili deviat nisi aliunde<sup>79</sup> illuminetur et dirigatur. Ergo cum lumen eius sit a fide et scriptura, et magis ratio nostra debet dirigere se et regulare<sup>80</sup> secundum ea quae consequuntur ex scriptura et fide, vel ei conveniunt vel<sup>81</sup> disconveniunt, quam secundum ea quae phantasiat<sup>82</sup> in rerum natura, nisi<sup>83</sup> ratio evidens vel certa experientia<sup>8485</sup> ei innotescat.

[11] Ideo dicendum quod tripliciter dicitur aliquid perfectum, secundum Magistrum *Sententiarum*, libro II, d. 4<sup>86</sup>. Est enim perfectum universaliter ut<sup>87</sup> cui nihil deest /F 108va/ universaliter de perfectione, et sic solus Deus<sup>88</sup> est perfectus<sup>89</sup>; et est perfectum secundum naturam ut cui nihil deest de<sup>90</sup> perfectione debita et convenienti suae naturae, sicut dicitur homo perfectus cum habet debitam aetatem<sup>91</sup> et corporis staturam<sup>92</sup> et quantitatem et potest in omnes actus convenientes humanae speciei; et est perfectum secundum tempus ut cui nihil deest de perfectione secundum tempus debita et convenienti. In statu autem innocentiae pueri non essent perfecti quoad corporales virtutes secundum naturam, quia non haberent quicquid perfectionis<sup>93</sup> congruit humanae naturae quoad virtutes corporales, quia nec generare nec honora portare nec cetera huiusmodi possent.

<sup>76</sup> natura] ratio AoN

<sup>77</sup> propter] per N

<sup>78</sup> ratio *om.* AoN

<sup>79</sup> aliunde] alio Ao; de aliud de *exp.* N (but with an indication that there is a marginal correction that cannot be found)

<sup>80</sup> et regulare *om.* Ao; et regere N

<sup>81</sup> vel] ita Ao

<sup>82</sup> phantasiat] phantasia AoN

<sup>83</sup> nisi] ibi N

<sup>84</sup> vel certa experientia] manifesta\* circa experimenta Ao

<sup>85</sup> experientia] experimenta N

<sup>86</sup> Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae* II, d. 4 (=cap. 19, 6): «Quod tribus modis dicitur perfectum: secundum tempus, secundum naturam, et universaliter perfectum [...]», ed. I. Brady, Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad claras aquas, Roma 1971, vol. I, pp. 350, l. 19-351, l. 3.

<sup>87</sup> ut] vel Ao; perfectum N

<sup>88</sup> solus Deus] solius Dei AoN

<sup>89</sup> perfectus] esse *add.* Ao; perfectio N

<sup>90</sup> de] eius *add.* N

<sup>91</sup> aetatem] entitatem F

<sup>92</sup> staturam] statum AoN

<sup>93</sup> perfectionis] perfectionem Ao; perfectioni N

Constat enim quod non haberent statim debitam corporis quantitatem et staturam<sup>94</sup>, tum<sup>95</sup> propter naturam humanae generationis et augmentationis quae naturaliter habent<sup>96</sup> secundum omnem statum quod<sup>97</sup> fiat<sup>98</sup> successive procedendo de imperfecto ad perfectum<sup>99</sup>, tum propter materni uteri quantitatem, propter quam<sup>100</sup> eos nasci parvulos oportet<sup>101</sup>. Et ideo cum quaedam vires corporales a quantitate et statu corporis dependeant, quoad has et quae pertinent ad<sup>102</sup> eas non essent tunc pueri<sup>103</sup> perfecti sed essent perfecti<sup>104</sup> secundum tempus, quia haberent omnem<sup>105</sup> perfectionem illi tempori<sup>106</sup> convenientem, ut posse<sup>107</sup> surgere et ambulare et posse<sup>108</sup> loqui et huiusmodi sine quibus humana indigentia pro statu illo compleri<sup>109</sup> non posset.

[12] Et hanc sententiam innuit Augustinus, *De baptismo parvulorum*, libro I<sup>110</sup>. Vult enim quod haberent<sup>111</sup> quasdam imperfectiones in quantitate corporis propter materni uteri quantitatem<sup>112</sup>, et in his quae perfectionem quantitatis naturaliter sequuntur; quasdam

<sup>94</sup> staturam] statutam N

<sup>95</sup> tum] unde N

<sup>96</sup> habent] habet AoF

<sup>97</sup> quod] et AoN

<sup>98</sup> fiat] fuerit\* Ao

<sup>99</sup> imperfecto ad perfectum] imperfecta ad perfectam AoN

<sup>100</sup> quam *om.* N

<sup>101</sup> oportet] oporteret AoN

<sup>102</sup> ad] quoad N

<sup>103</sup> pueri] parvi N

<sup>104</sup> sed essent perfecti *om. homeo.* N

<sup>105</sup> omnem] communem F

<sup>106</sup> tempori] etiam pori (!) Ao

<sup>107</sup> posse] posset Ao; possent F

<sup>108</sup> posse] posset AoF

<sup>109</sup> compleri] complere AoF

<sup>110</sup> Cf. Augustinus Hipponensis, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione, et de baptismo parvulorum ad Marcellinum libri tres*, lib. I, cap. 38, n. 69 (PL 44, col. 150; CSEL 60, p. 69, ll. 10-17): «Mouet enim si illi primi homines non peccassent, utrum tales essent filios habituri qui nec lingua nec manibus nec pedibus uterentur. Nam propter uteri capacitatem fortasse necesse fuerit parvulos nasci, quamvis, cum exigua sit pars corporis costa, non tamen propter hoc Deus parvulam viro coniugem fecit, quam aedificavit in mulierem. Unde et eius filios poterat omnipotentia creatoris mox editos grandes protinus facere».

<sup>111</sup> haberent] haberet N

<sup>112</sup> corporis propter materni uteri quantitatem *om. homeo.* AoN

vero non haberent<sup>113</sup> quas nunc habent<sup>114</sup> ut immobilitatem et impotentiam necessaria loquendi<sup>115</sup> et huiusmodi<sup>116</sup>. Et hoc expressius dicit in libro quem<sup>117</sup> tertio contra Iulianum scripsit, qui incipit “Magnis<sup>118</sup> licet impeditus negotiis<sup>119</sup>”, ubi libro IV sic dicit<sup>120</sup>: “Nascetur in paradiso humana natura fecunda<sup>121</sup>, etiamsi<sup>122</sup> nemo peccasset, donec Deo praecognitus numerus sanctorum compleretur. Sed illi parvuli nec flerent<sup>123</sup> in paradiso, nec muti essent, nec aliquando uti ratione non possent, nec sine usu membrorum infirmi et inertes iacerent, nec morbis affligerentur, nec a bestiis laedentur<sup>124</sup>, /Ao I40va/ nec venenis necarentur<sup>125</sup>, nec aliquo casu<sup>126</sup> vulnerarentur, nec ullo sensu, aut<sup>127</sup> ulla parte corporis privarentur, nec a daemonibus<sup>128</sup> vexarentur, nec surgentes<sup>129</sup> in pueritia<m><sup>130</sup> domarentur<sup>131</sup> verberibus<sup>132</sup>, aut erudirentur laboribus, nec ulli eorum tam<sup>133</sup> vano et<sup>134</sup> obtuso nascerentur ingenio<sup>135</sup>, nec labore nec dolore ullo, sed excepta propter incapaces uteros matrum sui corporis quantitate, tales omnino quales Adam gignerentur.”

[I3] Et sic<sup>136</sup> per iam dicta patent obiecta.

<sup>113</sup> haberent] habent N

<sup>114</sup> habent] habuerit\* N

<sup>115</sup> loquendi] quaerendi F

<sup>116</sup> et huiusmodi om. Ao

<sup>117</sup> quem] quam in F

<sup>118</sup> Magnis] magnus Ao

<sup>119</sup> negotiis] recte: angoribus; cf. Augustinus Hipponensis, *Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum*, I,1 (PL 45, col. 1051; CSEL 85.1, p. 5, l. 2).

<sup>120</sup> Augustinus Hipponensis, *Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum*, III, 198 (PL 45, col. 1332; CSEL 85.1, p. 497, ll. 10-23).

<sup>121</sup> fecunda om. N

<sup>122</sup> etiamsi] si N

<sup>123</sup> flerent] florent\* F

<sup>124</sup> laedentur] laederentur N

<sup>125</sup> necarentur] necatur Ao

<sup>126</sup> casu] ibi add. Ao

<sup>127</sup> sensu aut] servat Ao; sensu ac N

<sup>128</sup> daemonibus] daemioniis (!) F

<sup>129</sup> surgentes] suggestentes N

<sup>130</sup> in pueritia<m> om. Ao

<sup>131</sup> domarentur] demorarentur N

<sup>132</sup> verberibus] uberibus\* Ao

<sup>133</sup> tam om. Ao

<sup>134</sup> vano et] cacavo (!) Ao; vono N

<sup>135</sup> ingenio om. AoN

<sup>136</sup> Et sic om. N

[14] Ad illud Augustini patet quia loquitur de infirmitate inferente indigentiam<sup>137</sup> et actus necessarios pro statu illo privante – quod tunc pueri non habent.

[15] Ad secundum dicendum quod licet conclusio sit vera, non tamen sequitur ratione praemissarum<sup>138</sup>, quia etiam nunc<sup>139</sup> in statu miseriae nobilitatem habet<sup>140</sup> homo ceteris animalibus maiorem, et tamen non potest<sup>141</sup> mox natus incedere<sup>142</sup>, sicut quaedam<sup>143</sup> possunt<sup>144</sup>; immo secundum Philosophum, *De animalibus*<sup>145</sup>, “res ignobiliores<sup>146</sup> veniunt citius ad complementum.” Quoad<sup>147</sup> hoc<sup>148</sup> autem<sup>149</sup> valet argumentum quod, si istis datur virtus ad actus necessarios, quod homini sine peccato data esset.

[16] Ad tertium dicendum quod non est<sup>150</sup> omnino simile de imperfectione iuventutis et senectutis, quia imperfectio iuventutis est motus ad perfectionem et haec illi statui quoad<sup>151</sup> aliquid non repugnaret, licet quoad aliquid aliquando<sup>152</sup> repugnaret, ut visum est prius. Imperfectio vero senectutis est motus ad defectionem et corruptionem, et ideo simpliciter illi statui repugnaret.

[17] Ad primum in contrarium dicendum quod illud bene concludit quod non est in eis perfectio secundum naturam sed non

<sup>137</sup> indigentiam] indigentia N

<sup>138</sup> praemissarum] praemissorum Ao

<sup>139</sup> nunc] tunc Ao

<sup>140</sup> habet] haberet N

<sup>141</sup> potest] propter Ao

<sup>142</sup> incedere] videre AoN

<sup>143</sup> quaedam] quidam AoN

<sup>144</sup> possunt] ponunt Ao

<sup>145</sup> Aristoteles, *De generatione animalium*, IV 6, 775a20; cf. *Auctoritates extracte de libro Aristotilis de naturis animalium sub certis titulis*, n. 32: «Omnia minora et debiliora citius perveniunt ad complementum suum» (ed. in P. Beullens, *A 13<sup>th</sup>-Century Florilegium from Aristotle's Books on Animals: Auctoritates extracte de libro Aristotilis de naturis animalium*, in C. Steel-G. Guldentops-P. Beullens, eds., *Aristotle's Animals in the Middle Ages and Renaissance*, Leuven University Press, Leuven 1999, pp. 69-95, p. 90).

<sup>146</sup> ignobiliores] et debiliores *add.* AoN

<sup>147</sup> Quoad] ad Ao

<sup>148</sup> Quoad hoc] convenit\* N

<sup>149</sup> autem] bene *add.* AoN

<sup>150</sup> est] ibi *add.* N

<sup>151</sup> quoad] quo N

<sup>152</sup> aliquid aliquando] aliquod (*ante add. sed exp.*) F

quod<sup>153</sup> perfectio secundum tempus non<sup>154</sup> inesset.

[18] Ad secundum dicendum<sup>155</sup> quod generatum non est necesse esse imperfectum prius quam perfectum nisi<sup>156</sup> secundum hoc<sup>157</sup> quod dicitur /N 92rb/ perfectum secundum naturam non alio modo<sup>158</sup>.

### <Quaestio secunda>

[1] Quaeritur secundo utrum pueri mox nati haberent tunc usum rationis. Quod non videtur: usus rationis dependet ab ac-/F 108vb/-tibus virium sensitivarum. Sed tunc vires sensitivae in pueris non essent omnino perfectae. Ergo, etc. Probatio minoris: vires sensitivae dependent ab organis; sed pueri haberent tunc organa imperfecta; ergo, etc.

[2] Item, proportio debet esse inter perfectionem<sup>159</sup> et perfectibile. Sed tunc non esset in pueris perfectus actus et usus corporis. Ergo nec animae.

[3] Item, naturale est omnibus generatis procedere ab imperfecto ad perfectum quoad actus et operationes debitas suae speciei. Sed tunc homo exiret in esse per generationem. Ergo non haberet perfectionem actuum suae<sup>160</sup> speciei debitorum<sup>161</sup>.

[4] **Contra.** *Sapientia* 9<.15>: "Corpus quod corrumpitur aggravat animam"; ergo privatio usus rationis venit nunc<sup>162</sup> ex aggravatione animae a corpore. Sed tunc nulla esset aggravatio. Ergo, etc.

[5] Item, perfectior esset tunc in pueris usus rationis quam sit in aliis<sup>163</sup> animalibus usus estimationis sive imaginationis. Sed videmus quod pulli quorundam animalium mox nati habent bene usum estimationis, quia agnus cognoscit matrem et fugit lupum. Ergo, etc.

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<sup>153</sup> non quod *inv.* Ao

<sup>154</sup> non *om.* N

<sup>155</sup> secundum dicendum] quartum AoN

<sup>156</sup> nisi] non Ao

<sup>157</sup> hoc *om.* AoN

<sup>158</sup> alio modo] alia natura AoN

<sup>159</sup> perfectionem AoN : perfectum\* F

<sup>160</sup> speciei. Sed tunc ... suae *om. homeo.* Ao

<sup>161</sup> Sed tunc ... debitorum *om.* N

<sup>162</sup> nunc AoN : tunc F

<sup>163</sup> aliis] aliquibus *codd.*

[6] **Responsio.** Dicunt quidam<sup>164</sup> quod pueri tunc possent habere aliquem actum et usum rationis sed imperfectum ut eos qui ad statum illum pertinebant; perfectum autem usum rationis nullatenus tunc habere possent eo quod usus rationis dependet quodammodo ex usu virium sensitivarum quae<sup>165</sup> in eis /Ao 140vb/ tunc perfectae<sup>166</sup> non essent propter imperfectionem organorum, cum vires sensitivae habeant ab organis dependere.

[7] Sed hoc directe videtur esse<sup>167</sup> contra Augustinum, *Contra Iulianum*, qui dicit quod nec aliquando uti ratione non possent et tales omnino quales Adam gignerentur<sup>168</sup> excepta corporis quantitate, ut patet in auctoritate praeallegata in problemate praecedenti<sup>169</sup>.

[8] Ratio etiam hoc satis<sup>170</sup> idem manifestat esse falsum, nam<sup>171</sup> totum illud haberent tunc parvuli pro quo nunc tenentur rei<sup>172</sup> culpae originalis. Sed nunc tenentur<sup>173</sup> rei<sup>174</sup> <sup>175</sup> <culpa originalis>, quia Deum non intelligunt necque amant; nam cum iustitia originalis – ut in praecedentibus visum est<sup>176</sup> – esset iustitia gratuita, tantum privat eius privatio quantum poneret<ur> habitus eius et econverso. Ergo tunc parvuli Deum intelligerent et amarent; sed iste est actus perfectus rationis. Haberent ergo tunc actum rationis perfectum.

[9] Item, non posse praeceptum capere poena est peccati, ut vult Augustinus, I *De baptismo parvulorum*<sup>177</sup>, et III *De libero arbi-*

<sup>164</sup> Cf., e.g., Thomas de Aquino, *ST I*, q. 101, a. 2, resp.

<sup>165</sup> quae AoN : qui F

<sup>166</sup> perfectae N : perfecti AoF

<sup>167</sup> esse F : om. AoN

<sup>168</sup> gignerentur AoN : gignarentur (!) F

<sup>169</sup> Vide quaestionem praecedentem, §12.

<sup>170</sup> satis] in *add.* F

<sup>171</sup> nam AoN : iam *corr. ex.* nam F

<sup>172</sup> rei *codd.* : forte *rectius* ratione

<sup>173</sup> tenentur] teneretur AoN (F *om.*)

<sup>174</sup> rei *codd.* : forte *rectius* ratione

<sup>175</sup> culpa originalis .... rei *om. homeo.* F

<sup>176</sup> E.g. Petrus de Trabibus, II *Sent.*, d. 19, art. 3, q. 2 («Utrum immortalitas Adae inesset a natura vel a gratia»): «[...] haec perfectio naturae fuit in Adam iustitia originalis; et sic accipiendo, naturam includit gratiam et iustitiam gratuitam, iustitia enim originalis, secundum Anselmum, non dicitur originalis nisi quia habetur ab origine, et in alio non differt a personali» (F 105va).

<sup>177</sup> Augustinus, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione, et de baptismo parvulorum ad Marcellinum libri tres*, lib. I, cap. 36, n. 67 (PL 44, col. 149; CSEL 60, pp. 67, l. 24- 68, l. 4): «In illas igitur ignorantiae densissimas tenebras, ubi anima infantis recentis ab utero, utique anima hominis, utique anima rationalis, non solum indocta, verum

*trio*<sup>178</sup>, et ratio satis ostendit, quoniam sicut homo tenetur naturaliter non concupiscere actu et habitu, sic tenetur non ignorare quae sunt ei agenda vel posse ea scire. Sed constat quod stante innocentia non esset peccati poena; ergo tunc esset homo semper et secundum omnem aetatem praecepti capax et posset illud implere. Sed hoc ponit perfectum usum rationis. Haberent ergo tunc pueri perfectum usum rationis.

[10] Item, omnis utens ratione non perfecte potens uti potest errare et in errorem incidere, quia eo quod potest aliquo modo ratione uti, potest verum aliquod inquirere; eo autem quod non potest perfecte uti potest falsum pro vero approbare, quod est error, secundum Augustinum<sup>179</sup>. Sed<sup>180</sup> stante innocentia non poterat homo errare, secundum Augustinum in *Enchiridion*\* et in pluribus locis<sup>181</sup>. Ergo aut habebat usum rationis perfectum aut nullum.

[11] Videtur igitur dicendum quod duplex est usus rationis, quidam proveniens ex naturali ingenio sive iudicio, quidam vero procedens ex exercitio sive ex habitu acquisito. Constat autem<sup>182</sup> quod homo in multis exercitatus et expertus melius iudicat et syllogizat quam ante talem experientiam vel exercitium faciebat; et de pluribus habet facultatem ad syllogizandum. In statu igitur innocentiae haberent pueri usum rationis perfectum secundum primum modum, quia essent capaces rationis et praecepti, sed non secundo modo, secundum quod experientia et exercitio carerent. Et concedendae

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etiam indocilis iacet, quare aut quando aut unde contrusa est? Si natura est hominis sic incipere, et non iam vitiosa est ista natura, cur non talis creatus est Adam? Cur ille capax praecepti et valens uxori et omnibus animalibus nomina imponere?».

<sup>178</sup> Fortasse Augustinus Hipponensis, *De libero arbitrio*, lib. III, 18, 52 (PL 32, col. 1296; CSEL 74, p. 133, ll. 7-10; CCL 29, p. 306, ll. 52-55): «Sed approbare falsa pro veris ut erret invitus, et resistente atque torquente dolore carnalis vinculi non posse a libidinosis operibus temperare, non est natura instituti hominis sed poena damnati».

<sup>179</sup> Cf. e.g., Augustinus Hipponensis, *Enchiridion ad Laurentium de fide et spe et charitate*, V, 17 (PL 40, col. 239; CCL 46, p. 57, ll. 23-24, 45-46): «[...] pro vero quippe approbat falsum, quod est erroris proprium [...] aliud non sit errare quam verum putare quod falsum est falsumve quod verum est».

<sup>180</sup> Sed AoN : quod F

<sup>181</sup> E.g., Augustinus Hipponensis, *Enchiridion ad Laurentium de fide et spe et charitate*, VIII, 24 (PL 40, col. 244; CCL 46, p. 63, ll. 9-12): «Hoc primum est creaturae rationalis malum, id est prima privatio boni. Deinde iam etiam nolentibus subintravit ignorantia rerum agendarum et concupiscentia noxiarum, quibus comites subinferuntur error et dolor [...]».

<sup>182</sup> autem N : om. AoF

sunt rationes quae hoc probant.

[12] Ad primum in contrarium dicendum quod, licet in statu innocentiae non essent in pueris perfecta organa sensitivarum secundum quantitatem, essent tamen perfecta /F 109ra/ secundum debitam dispositionem ad actum; tunc et nunc pueri valde vigeant in actibus exterioribus <et interioribus> sensitivae, tunc autem esset proportio membrorum et complexionis totius corporis debite sibi correspondens, quod nunc non esse constat. Unde et organa animae, tam interiora quam exteriora, essent suis potentiis et earum actibus debite proportionata.

[13] Ad secundum dicendum quod perfectum non oportet simpliciter et absolute proportionari perfectibili /Ao 141ra/ suo sed secundum rationem qua<sup>183</sup> sibi mutuo referuntur, oportet enim quod perfectibile secundum rationem qua est perfectibile suae perfectioni proportionetur et e converso. Licet autem tunc non esset corpus perfectum secundum quantitatem /N 92va/ et staturam nec secundum vires quae staturam consequuntur, esset tamen perfectum secundum rationem qua<sup>184</sup> est ab anima perfectibile et secundum quod est eius instrumentum.

[14] Ad tertium dicendum quod in animalibus<sup>185</sup> sunt quidam actus qui dependent principaliter a corpore sicut posse generare et huiusmodi, et in talibus oportet<sup>186</sup> illud habere veritatem; quidam qui dependent<sup>187</sup> principaliter ab anima, ut intelligere et sentire, et in talibus non habet illud universaliter veritatem, constat <enim> quod ita potest videre colorem parvulus sicut magnus et fere in omnibus sensibus ita vigeant. Sic et tunc in actibus rationis potens esset, quia quod non est poena, non est peccati. Vel dicendum quod perfectio actus rationis debita humanae speciei non est posse ratiocinari et posse iudicare<sup>188</sup> scientiam acquirendo sed ex scientia habita sentiando, et sic verum est quod non haberent usum perfectum rationis, ut dictum est, sed procederent de imperfecto ad perfectum, et hoc magis in sequentibus patefiet.

<sup>183</sup> qua F : quae Ao (*om.* N)

<sup>184</sup> qua AoN : quae F

<sup>185</sup> animalibus FN : hominibus Ao

<sup>186</sup> oportet AoN : *om.* F

<sup>187</sup> dependent N : dependet AoF

<sup>188</sup> iudicare AoN : indicare F



<Quaestio tertia>

Quaeritur tertio utrum pueri in statu innocentiae nascerentur iusti. Quod non [...]

<Quaestio quarta>

Quaeritur quarto utrum in statu innocentiae nascerentur omnes in iustitia confirmata. Quod sic [...]

<Quaestio quinta>

[1] Quinto quaeritur utrum tunc filii nascerentur in scientia perfecti. Quod sic videtur. Augustinus, *Contra Iulianum*, libro<sup>189</sup> quem contra eum tertio scripsit<sup>190</sup>: excepta corporis quantitate, tales omnino qualis erat Adam gignerentur. Sed Adam ponitur perfectus in scientia. Ergo, etc.

[2] Item, ignorantia est nobis inflicta propter peccatum, ut dicit Beda<sup>191</sup>. Sed ignorantia est privatio /F 109vb/ scientiae. Ergo, cum tunc non esset in eis poena peccati, non esset in eis ignorantia. Ergo habuissent scientiam perfectam.

[3] Item, pueri mox <nati> iustitiam habuissent, ut visum est prius<sup>192</sup>. Sed ad iustitiam requiritur scientia, quae dirigit in agendis. Ergo, etc.

[4] **Contra.** Anima nostra nata<sup>193</sup> est sicut tabula in qua nihil est actu pictum, ut dicitur III *De anima*<sup>194</sup>. Sed eadem est natura

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<sup>189</sup> libro AoN : libro I F

<sup>190</sup> Augustinus Hipponensis, *Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum*, III, 198 (PL 45, col. 1332; CSEL 85.1, p. 497, ll. 22-23). Vide quaestionem primam, §12.

<sup>191</sup> Haec positio communitur adscripta Bedae; cf. Bonaventura, OpOm II, p. 528, nota 2, et cf. Beda, *In Lucae Evangelium expositio*, in Lucam 10.30-34 (PL 92, col. 469; CCL 120, pp. 222-224), e.g. (CCL 120, p. 223, ll. 2232-2235): «Ex qua enim parte sapere et cognoscere Deum potest vivus est homo, ex qua vero peccatis contabescit et miseria deficit mortuus idem letiferoque est vulnere foedatus».

<sup>192</sup> Cf. Petrus de Trabibus, ista distinctio, q. 3: «[...] filii nascerentur omnes iusti, non solum quia non essent peccatores, ut quidam male exponunt, sed quia essent ad actus meritorios dispositi et informati» (F 109ra).

<sup>193</sup> nata N : naturalis AoF

<sup>194</sup> Aristoteles, *De anima*, III 4, 429b29-430a1; cf. AA, p. 186, n. 146: «Intellectus possibilis

animae modo et tunc. Ergo, etc.

[5] Item, scientia non habetur naturaliter ab homine nisi aut per doctrinam aut per inventionem. Sed pueri non possent aliquo istorum modorum scientiam habuisse. Ergo non nascerentur<sup>195</sup> <in> scientia perfecti.

[6] **Responsio.** Dicendum quod nec auctoritas dicit nec ratio ostendit quod, si homo stetisset, deberent posteriores scientiam accipere de communi lege nisi modo quo animae congruit secundum sui naturalem institutionem. Anima autem sic est naturaliter /Ao 142ra/ instituta ut accipiat scientiam et cognitionem mediantibus sensitivis potentiis. Cum autem<sup>196</sup> hoc facere non possit nisi mediante perceptione obiectorum et quadam eorum experientia, necesse esset quod etiam tunc pueri scientiam acciperent successive quodammodo acqui-  
rendo. Et hoc maxime patet esse verum si ea quae dicta sunt superius de cognitione angelorum attendantur<sup>197</sup>, quoniam scientia in memoria est quaedam retentio actuum et conceptuum apprehensorum rerum<sup>198</sup> in ipsa, quoniam scientia realiter et essentialiter non videtur<sup>199</sup> addere super specierum retentionem<sup>200</sup>. Species autem in anima, secundum Augustinum et Anselmum<sup>201</sup>, sunt quidam actus animae et conceptus

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et primo tamquam tabula rasa in qua nihil est depictum [...]».

<sup>195</sup> nascerentur AoN : nasceretur F

<sup>196</sup> autem AoN : om. F

<sup>197</sup> Cf. e.g. Petrus de Trabibus, II *Sent.*, d. 3, art. 4, q. 2 («Utrum angelus cognoscat res mundanas per species innatas»): «[...] actus intelligendi praesupponit rei praesentiam vel in sua substantia vel in suo proprio effectu, vel causa exemplari vel efficiente. Praesentiam dico rei in esse, ut in actu apprehensionis, vel in fuisse, ut in actu recordationis. Apprehensio enim est actus cognitionis, quo non existente nullus alius consequi potest. Omnis autem apprehensio actus est alicuius apprehensio, et non nisi rei obiectae\* sit, et ita actus apprehensionis necessario requirit rem obiectam habere praesentem; recordatio enim est conversio potentiae intellectivae super rem prius apprehensam, et ita recordatio etiam supponit rei praesentiam» (F 32rb).

<sup>198</sup> apprehensorum rerum *coni.*] apprehensionum F; apprehensione\* Ao; apprehensive\* N

<sup>199</sup> videtur AoN : videretur F

<sup>200</sup> retentionem AoN : intentionem F

<sup>201</sup> Cf., e.g., Augustinus Hipponensis, *De trinitate*, XV 10, et fortasse praecipue XI 7, II (PL 42, col. 993; CCL 50, p. 347, ll. 7-12): «Erat <species> enim in memoria et priusquam cogitaretur a nobis [...] Sed cum cogitatur ex illa quam memoria tenet, exprimitur in acie cogitantis et reminiscendo formatur ea species quae quasi proles est eius quam memoria tenet». Cf. e.g., fortasse Anselmus Cantuariensis, *Monologion*, cap. 33 (PL 158, col. 188; Anselmi opera omnia, ed. Schmitt, Ex officina abbatiae Seccoviensis, Edinburgh 1938, vol. 1, p. 52, ll. 20-24): «Cum enim cogito notum mihi

de rebus apprehensis. Constat autem quod talis retentio naturaliter in pueris non potuerit<sup>202</sup> esse, immo oportet quod fieret successive, et ita necesse esset quod acquirerent scientiam successive. Acquirerent tamen eam<sup>203</sup> tunc facilius, perfectius, et plenius quam possit modo acquiri. Facilius, quoniam mox [quo] possunt uti sensibus, possent uti ratione, et verum in rebus et ex rebus percipere et iudicare; mox etiam inconvenientia vel disconvenientia compositionis et divisionis, veritas vel falsitas faciliter apparet, quod nunc in pluribus fit cum difficultate. Perfectius etiam tunc scientiam acquirerent, quoniam certitudinaliter et sine erroris permixtione iudicarent. Plenius vero, quoniam experite verum attingerent, et experite attingere illud [non] possent respectu eorum quae ab eis<sup>204</sup> pro statu illo et tempore cognoscibilia forent. Et sic concedo rationes ad partem negativam.

[7] Ad primum in contrarium dicendum quod illud Augustini intelligitur de perfectionibus animae quoad modum naturalem. Si autem Adam habuit scientiam a sui creatione, non fuit hoc ex corpore hominis et animae natura, sed ex speciali gratia; sed de hoc videbitur magis infra<sup>205</sup>. Hoc tamen posito /N 93rb/ non sequitur quod pueri similiter eam haberent.

[8] Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod ignorantia est nobis propter peccatum inflictam, non accipitur ibi 'ignorantia' pro carentia scientiae quam in pueritia dicitur homo actu habere, sed quam deberet habere in promptitudine et facilitate componendi<sup>206</sup> et dividendi quam modo non habet homo propter poenam peccati, tunc autem habuisset.

[9] Ad tertium dicendum quod scientia dupliciter potest accipi, sicut de ignorantia est dictum: uno modo potest dici scientia habitus animae superadditus, alio modo naturale iudicium et facili-

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hominem absentem, formatur acies cogitationis meae in talem imaginem eius, qualem illam per visum oculorum in memoriam attraxi. Quae imago in cogitatione verbum est eiusdem hominis, quem cogitando dico».

<sup>202</sup> potuerit F : potuit AoN

<sup>203</sup> eam AoN : ea F

<sup>204</sup> eis AoN : eis quae F

<sup>205</sup> Vide Petrus de Trabibus, II *Sent.*, d. 23, art. 2, q. I («Utrum Adam in statu innocentiae habuerit omnium rerum cognitionem»): «[...] cognitio rerum, quibus nomina imposuit, partim fuit a natura, quia mediante sensuum experientia, partim a gratia quantum ad hoc, scilicet quod non oportuit per diversa loca et tempora rerum experientiam mediare, eo quod omnia sibi praesentialiter assistebant» (F 117rb).

<sup>206</sup> [componendi] cognoscendi *codd.*

tas<sup>207</sup> ad iudicandum ipsius intellectus. Primo modo non requiritur scientia ad iustitiam nisi in adultis, sed secundo modo – et talis tunc in parvulis esset.

*KU Leuven*

[russell.friedman@kuleuven.be](mailto:russell.friedman@kuleuven.be)

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<sup>207</sup> *facilitas FN : facultas Ao*